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Defendant Class Certification: The
Difficulties Under Rule 23(b)(2) and the
Rule 65(d) Solution
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Rule 23, governing class actions, was amended in 1966,1
both plaintiff and defendant classes were envisioned. 2 However, because of the specific language of 23(b)(2) governing class actions
where equitable relief is sought,3 courts have not been consistent in
their interpretations of 23(b)(2) on whether to certify defendant
4

classes .

The United States Supreme Court has never specifically ruled on
whether defendant classes may be certified under 23(b)(2) 5 and the
decisions of the circuit courts of appeals have not been in agreement
on the proper scope of defendant class certification under the (b)(2)

classification. Some circuit courts have simply refused to certify
defendant classes citing the language of 23(b)(2) 6 while other circuit
courts have granted certification. 7
1. Rule 23 of the FEDERAL RuLEs OF CivrL PROCEDURE governs class actions
in the Federal Courts.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides in part: "One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued
.....

.

3. See infra notes 76-109 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
5. However, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this question in
Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
283 (1987). The Court, however, has seen defendant classes in the past. See e.g.,
Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); Secretary of Pub. Welfare of Pennsylvania v.
Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333 (1968).
6. Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 283 (1987). Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983);
Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1129 (1981).
7. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds
sub nom., Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d
59 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Rule 23(b)(2) has frequently been used to facilitate civil rights
class actions. 8 Claims have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 and
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964),10 where plaintiffs
have sought both defendant and plaintiff class certification, thus
becoming bilateral class actions. 1 Often these bilateral class actions
involve suits where plaintiffs are challenging the facial validity of a

8.

FED.

R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 98,

102 (1966) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Note]. While Rule 23(b)(2) has been

frequently used in civil rights actions, the Advisory Committee Note states that
"[s]ubdivision (b)(2) is not limited to civil rights case." Id.

Id.

Id.

9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Civil Action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
.or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute
of the District of Columbia.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides in relevant part:
Discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
(a) Employers. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.

11. See Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff class of persons
unable to post bond versus a defendant class of county sheriffs), vacated on other
grounds sub nom., Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); Callahan v. Wallace,
466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff class challenging judicial fee system versus a
defendant class of judicial officers); Doss v. Long 93 F.R.D. 112 (N. D. Ga. 1981)
(another plaintiff class challenging a judicial fee system versus a defendant class of
judicial officers; Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (plaintiff
class of welfare recipients versus a defendant class of township trustees); Redhail v.
Zablocki', 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (plaintiff class of persons not allowed
to marry because of non-payment of child support versus a defendant class of county
clerks), aff'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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statute, regulation, or administrative order.' 2 In these cases, a group
of officials charged with administering a statute can be certified as a
defendant class making for more widespread relief for plaintiffs.
This comment will first discuss a brief history of class actions.
Next this comment will discuss the general requirements to certify a
class under Rule 23. Then sub-division 23(b)(2) will be discussed in
detail describing the inconsistent approaches taken by the circuit courts
of appeals,' 3 and how the various approaches used to certify defendant
classes under 23(b)(2) do not completely satisfy the requirements of
the rule. Finally, this comment will discuss how plaintiffs can use
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) to bind unnamed parties when
courts refuse to certify defendant classes.
II.

HISTORY

Class actions have a three hundred year history1 which date back
to the equity courts in England. 5 In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, defendant classes were as common as plaintiff classes' 6 and
the bill of peace was developed by the English Court of Chancery to
facilitate the adjudication. 7 "It was the English bill of peace that
developed into what is now known as the class action."' 8
12. See Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (permission
to marry statute challenged), aff'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F.
Supp. 38 (D.C. Pa. 1973) (repossession statute challenged), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d
Cir. 1975); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (institutional
commitment statute challenged); Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo.
1972) (durational residency statute challenged).
13. Circuit courts of appeals which have allowed defendant class certification
under Rule 23(b)(2): Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds sub nom., Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979); Callahan v. Wallace,
466 F.2d (5th Cir. 1972). Circuit courts of appeals that have refused to certify
defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2): Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410
(7th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987). Thompson v. Board of Education,
709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983), Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980)
(same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
14. 3B J.MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.02[l], at
23-31 (2d ed. 1987).
15. Id. at 23-32.
16. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the
Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 866, 880 (1977). These early cases differed from

modern class actions in two respects: 1) the groups "existed as social entities
independent of the lawsuit" and 2) "the issues at stake involved incidents of status
rather than individual claims of right." Id. at 877.
17. See 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 1751, at 7 (1986) describing the bill of peace:
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Because of the development of the class action through the
English bill of peace, when class actions emerged in the United States
they were of "equitable cognizance only."' 9 The English practice was
adopted by American courts and defendant class actions were litigated
under the same circumstances as in England. 20 One of the first
American cases which recognized a defendant class was Smith v.
Swormstedt.21 In this case, two factions of the Methodist Episcopal
Church brought suit over the disposition of the church property after
the church divided in 1844.22 The Supreme Court, by allowing this
representative suit involving both a plaintiff and a defendant class,
adopted the doctrine of Justice Story, who had built upon English
23
common law doctrines.

When the rules governing class action began to be codified and
English equity practice was incorporated, the American courts still
had trouble determining who could be bound by judgment. Federal
Equity Rule 48,24 the first codification, stated that while a court had
discretion to require all interested persons be named as parties, the
judgment was without prejudice to the unnamed parties. 25 Equity Rule
That device [the bill of peace] enabled an equity court to hear an action by
or against representatives of a group if plaintiff could establish that the
number of people involved was so large as to make joinder impossible or
impracticable, that all the members of the group possessed a joint interest
in the question to be adjudicated, and that the named parties adequately
represented those absent from the action.
Id.at 7-8.
18. Id.at 8.
19. Id.at 10.
This was true not only because of the rigid common law rules discouraging
joinder of parties inherited from England but because the procedural
machinery of the law courts was not well adapted to protect the rights of
unknown, unnamed, or nonparticipating persons whose interest in the
dispute might be concluded by the litigation.
Id.at 11.

20. Note, Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM.

L. REV. 1371, 1381 (1984). The author goes on to state that because FED. R. CIV. P.
23 incorporated early equity practice "the authority for binding absent class members
under Rule 23 reaches back to the English practice." Id.
21. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
22. Id.at 298, 300.
23. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1751, at 9-10.
Justice Story is recognized as having formulated the standards of class action theory
for the United States. See generally STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1848).
24. Reprinted in 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1751,
at 12 n.22.
25. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1751, at 13.
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38, adopted in 1912, omitted the passage on the effect of judgment
on a non-party. However, there continued to be uncertainty over who
26
could be bound.

In 1938, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was adopted and
Swormstedt was cited as an example of the rule. 27 Furthermore, when
Rule 23 was amended in 1966, defendant class actions were again
clearly included in the rule. 28 However, while defendant classes have
been recognized in American application of the class action device,
the various forms of class action rules as they have developed have
shown confusion over who may be bound. In the case of a 23(b)(2)
defendant class, who may be certified as a class and thus be bound
in a court order, is a debate still taking place in the Circuit Courts of
29
Appeal.
III. RULE 23
Before a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(2), it must meet the*
requirements of 23(a).10 Once a class has met the requirements of
23(a), it can be certified under one of the three categories of 23(b). 31
A.

RULE 23(a) REQUIREMENTS

Rule 23(a) contemplates certifying both defendant and plaintiff
classes. 3 2 The 23(a) elements require that the class be too large for
Courts seemed to invoke this rule when they believed the absent class members had
not been adequately represented. See Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College of the Western
Reserve Univ., 208 U.S. 609 (1908). However, in Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 288, 303 (1853), the Court ignored Equity Rule 48 and held all class members
bound even if not before the Court.
26. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1751, at 13.

"Although this omission removed the express limitation upon the effect of a
represerqtative suit, it did not necessarily solve the question whether binding absent
class members was consistent with due process and the notion of a right to a day in
court." Id.
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee note (note to original Rule 23
(1937)), reprinted in 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 14, at 23-13.
28. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a) provides in part:
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued ......
29. Compare Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.) (defendant class certification not allowed), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987), with
Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant class certification
allowed), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915
(1979).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides in relevant part:
"Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied ...
31. See infra note 49.
32. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) provides:
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practicable joinder, that there are common questions of law or fact
between class members, that the class representative's claims or defenses in the suit are typical of the class, and that the named
representative must be able to adequately defend the interests of the
class. 33 These four elements are generally known as numerousity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, respectively.
The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proving these
four elements.14 Each requirement must be met whether a party wishes
to certify a plaintiff or defendant class."
1. Numerousity.
The numerosity requirement is "the elementary requirement that
supports the whole theory of class actions - representation by one
person of a group so numerous that joinder in one suit would be
impracticable.1 3 6 The controlling question is whether the class is too
large for practicable joinder. 17 The numerosity requirement does not
specify a maximum or minimum number needed for class certifica39
tion.3" Each case should be examined on an individual basis.
2.

Commonality.

The commonality element requires that there be common questions of law or fact.4 Although these common questions need not be

Id.

Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
33. Id.

34. See Fleming v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 707 F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir.
1983); Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1980).
35. See supra note 32.
36. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 625 F.2d 1016
(1980).
37. See supra note 32.
38. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980).
39. Id.
40. See Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 (5th Cir. 1982)(In a bilateral class
action, the court refused to certify a plaintiff class because there was no common
questions of law or fact. Held, "there must be at least one issue whose resolution
will affect all of a significant number of the putative class members.").
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identical, the rule seems to require that there be more than one
common question.41 However, in interpreting Rule 23(a), many courts
have given the commonality requirement a liberal application and
42
have required only one common question.
3.

Typicality.

The typicality requirement is fulfilled when each member of a
class would have either a claim or defense that has "substantial
similarity" to the claims or defenses of the other class members.4 3
The claims and defenses need not be identical." However, if a unique
claim or defense is present in the suit "that will consume the merits
of the case, then the typicality requirement has not been met. ' 45 How
the claim or defense is defined will also be determinative. If a broad
construction is given to the claim or defense, such as racial discrimination, then the typicality requirement is more easily met.4
4.

Adequacy of Representation.

Two requirements must be met to certify a plaintiff class and
determine the adequacy of representation: "(a) the plaintiff's attorney
must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the
proposed litigation, and (b) the plaintiff must not have interests
antagonistic to those of the class." ' 47 When this rule is applied to
defendant class representation, it does not require a willing class
41. See 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER, M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1763, at 198
(The language of 23(a)(2) seems to require more than one common question).
42. Id. at 199 (However, "courts that have focused on 23(a)(2) have given it a
permissive application ....

).

43. See Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n. of Illinois, Inc.,
97 F.R.D. 668, 678 (N.D. I11.1983) ("Typicality does not require that the defenses
be identical or perfectly coextensive; substantial similarity is sufficient.").
44. Id.
45. Id. Although the typicality requirement has caused some confusion in its
application. 7A C. WRIGHT A. MLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1764, at 228.
"There is some doubt as to the exact meaning of the 'typicality' requirement." Id.
"Thus, it has been stated that the typicality requirement was 'designed to buttress
the fair representation requirement in Rule 23(a)(4)." Id. at 232.
46. See Gilchrist v. Bolger, 89 F.R.D. 402., 407 (S.D. Ga. 1981). The Fifth
Circuit has given special consideration to Title VII discrimination cases. The allegation
is enough to satisfy 23(a)(3) requirements.
47. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975), citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562
(2d Cir. 1968).
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representative, but an adequate one.48 The court must look at whether,
in protecting the named defendant's interest in the litigation, the

representative will protect the interests of the other class members.4 9
B.

RULE 23(B)(1) AND 23(B)(3)

After the requirements of 23(a) have been satisfied, the court

must decide under which of the 23(b) classifications the class falls and

the class must be certified under one of these divisions.50 The three

divisions are designed for three different purposes. The 23(bi(1)
category is utilized to certify a class when there is a risk of inconsistent
judgments if each class member instituted a separate suit.5" The
23(b)(2) classification is used to facilitate equitable relief. 2 Finally,
23(b)(3) is designed to maintain a class when common questions of
48. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1239 (2d Cir. 1979), remanded sub
nom., Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979).
49. Id.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would be as a practical matter of dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting any
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
51. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(1).
52. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(2).
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either law or fact predominate and the class action is the best way to
resolve the dispute. 53
The language of 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3) makes it clear that both
plaintiff and defendant classes are allowed.14 While these two subdivisions seem clear on wheither defendant classes can be certified, a
brief discussion of 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3), and how they are difficult
to use in place of 23(b)(2), is useful before going on to 23(b)(2).
1. Rule 23(b)(3)

The 23(b)(3) category allows class actions to be certified when
common questions of law or fact predominate and the class action is
the best way to resolve the issue. 5 The practical problem with this
subdivision is that.class members may opt out.5 6 Rule 23(b)(c) requires

that the class members consent to the litigation regardless of whether
the class members are in a plaintiff or defendant class. 7 Each member
of the class must be notified and if the class member does not wish
to participate in the suit, he or she may opt out. The practical effect
of a 23(b)(3) suit is that it has limited utility when "the broad

enforcement of substantive rights is a primary goal of defendant class
litigation""5 because defendant class members can easily opt out.5 9
53. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(3).
54. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(3). In 23(b)(1), class actions are allowed "by or
against individual members of the class ......
".In 23(b)(3), the rule mentions plaintiff
and defendant classes several times: "the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense.. . , the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class. . ....
55. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgement, whether favorable
or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does n6t request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
56. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(3).
57. See supra note 53, at 23(c)(2), which states that "[t]he notice shall advise
each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests .....
Id.
58. Comment, Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 283, 307 (1985).
59. See Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (a defendant class of currency exchanges was certified under 23(b)(3));
In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (a defendant class was
certified involving security underwriters).
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However, this problem has not kept courts from certifying defendant
classes under 23(b)(3). 60 The defendant's ability to opt out, however,

makes this category impracticable.
2.

Rule 23(b)(1)

61
Rule 23(b)(1) allows both plaintiff and defendant class actions.
This category provides a class action setting where the risk of inconsistent adjudications would occur if plaintiffs have to bring separate

actions. 62 The 23(b)(1) subdivision is divided into two categories, (A)
and (B). 63 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is used to protect the party opposing the
class itself. 64 Classes
class in the lawsuit and 23(b)(1)(B) protects the
65

can be certified under either category or both.
a.

Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) exists so that a party opposing a class can avoid

the risk that differing standards might be used if each cause of action

is tried separately. 66 For instance, if a plaintiff has to bring an action

separately for every possible defendant, each court could offer a

different judgment when the suits are tried. The Advisory Committee

Note lists various ways the (b)(1)(A) subdivision might be used. For
' 67
example, a class of taxpayers might seek to "invalidate an assessment
60. See supra note 30, at 23(b)(3).
61. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 8, at 100 ("The difficulties which
would be likely to arise if resort were had to separate actions by or against the
individual members of the class here furnish the reasons for and the principal key
to, the propriety and value of utilizing the class action device.").
62. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(1).
63. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 8, at 100 ,("One person may have
rights against, or be under duties toward numerous persons constituting a class, and
be so positioned that conflicting or varying adjudications in lawsuits with individual
members of the class might establish incompatible standards to govern his conduct.").
64. Id. at 100-01 ("This clause takes in a situation where the judgment in a
nonclass action by or against an individual member of the class, while not technically
concluding the other members, might do so as a practical matter.").
65. 7A C. W~ionT, A. MILLER & M. KANiE, supra note 17, § 1772 ("[lit is
quite common for suits brought under subdivision (b)(1) to meet both the test for
clause (A) and for clause (B) of that provision.").
66. See Comment, Defendant Class Actions, supra note 56, at 308.
67. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 8, at 100 ("Separate actions by
individuals against a municipality to declare a bond issue invalid or condition or limit
it, to prevent or limit the making of a particular appropriation or to compel or
invalidate an assessment might create a use of inconsistent or varying determinations.").
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or a defendant class might be certified under the (b)(1)(A) category
in order to determine riparian rights of an individual against a group
of riparian landowners or used to determine the "rights and duties
68
respecting a claimed nuisance."
b.

Rule 23(b)(1)(B)

Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is designed to facilitate a class action where the
issue being litigated would be dispositive of the interests of a group
of plaintiffs or defendants. 69 For instance, in a situation where members of a fraternal beneficial society are suing for reorganization, it
makes little sense to have a group of individual plaintiffs engaged in
separate litigation because when the issue is decided it would apply to
all members of the organization. Therefore, the members of the
organization should be certified as a plaintiff class. 70 In the case of a
defendant class certification, a class should be certified if the issues
under consideration are just as dispositive for other individuals as
they are for the named individual in the suit. 71
The Advisory Committee Notes do not discuss whether the
23(b)(1) category could be used to determine the civil rights of
individuals against a class of government officials or others involved
in administering a statute or administrative order .72 This is usually
considered in the realm of 23(b)(2). 73 However, defendant classes of
semi-autonomous public officials have' been certified under
23(b)(1)(B). 74 One commentator has expressly argued that this category
be used to avoid the difficulty of certifying defendant classes under

68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 101 ("In an action by policy holders against a fraternal benefit
association attacking a financial reorganization of the society, it would hardly have
been practical if indeed it would have been possible to confine the effects of a
validation of the reorganization to the individual plaintiffs.").

71. Id. ("In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of

the class will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect on the interests
of other members who should therefore be represented in the lawsuit.").
72. See generally Advisory Committee Note, supra note 8, at 100-02.
73. Id. at 102 ("Illustrative of 23(b)(2) are various actions in the civil rights
field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.").
74. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (a class of state school districts was certified under 23(b)(l)(B)
in order for plaintiffs to challenge a statute requiring retarded children to be denied
access to public schools).
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23(b)(2), 7 but this approach is impractical. This approach is impractical because the test used for determining who may be certified under
23(b)(1) is very similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19,76 the
joinder provision. Some courts have determined that if there is no
risk of inconsistent judgments, then the action cannot be maintained
as a class action unless the class would fit some other provision of
23(b). 77 In addition, the Advisory Committee Notes clearly indicate
75. See generally Comment, Defendant Class Actions, supra note 56 (the author
argues in his comment that instead of working around the troubled language of
23(b)(2), 23(b)(1) could be more generally used to facilitate civil rights litigation when
class defendants are involved).
76. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1772; see also
FED. R. CIv. P. 19 which provides:
Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication
(a) Person to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service
of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do
so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render
the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person
as described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action
should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the
absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be
considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered
in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties;
second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the
action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Id.
77. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1772. The authors
cite Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7 (D.C. Ill. 1969) as an
example of a case in which a plaintiff class tried to bring a civil rights class action
under 23(b)(1). The suit concerned a group of realty purchases by blacks who claimed
that racial segregation was being continued through a system of price fixing in
violation of antitrust laws. The court refused to certify the class because the different
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that actions primarily involving the need for injunctive or declaratory
relief should generally be brought under 23(b)(2) as discussed below.
C.

1.

RULE 23(B)(2)

The language of 23(b)(2) and why it has caused problems in

interpretation.

The difficulty in certifying a defendant class under 23(b)(2) stems

from the language of the rule itself. 78 Rule 23(b)(2) states that a class

action is maintainable when "the party opposing the class has acted.

or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole." 79 This language states that

the 23(b)(2) suit is brought when a class needs injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief from the act or non act of the opposing

party. In that case if a defendant class certification is sought, then
the plaintiff or plaintiff class, as the party opposing the class, must
have acted or refused to act in a manner requiring injunctive or
declaratory relief appropriate for the defendant class. This is rarely

the case. It is usually a defendant class that has acted or refused to.

act in a manner that requires relief for plaintiffs.80 For instance, in a
class action for equitable relief, it is the defendant who refuses to
enforce a statute or enforce a possible unconstitutional statute that

causes the plaintiff to file a class action suit under 23(b)(2). 81

In the Advisory Committee Notes, the framers do not discuss the
possibility of a defendant class under the 23(b)(2) subdivision.8 2 Alresults that different actions might reach would be from the different facts surrounding each real estate transaction.
78. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(2).
79. See supra note 48, at 23(b)(2).
80. See Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir.) ("Always
it is the alleged wrongdoer, the defendant-never the plaintiff... who will have 'acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class' "), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 283 (1987).
81. Id. In Henson, the plaintiffs were seeking to require the court to order the
defendants to follow state guidelines for welfare eligibility. In this case then, the
court held that no one is complaining about any act or refusal to act by Henson or
by any member of the plaintiff class.
82. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 8, at 102. In the list of
illustrations of proper 23(b)(2) classes the Advisory Committee Notes suggest that
"[i]llustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged
with discriminating unlawfully against a class .... "; See also Henson, 814 F.2d at
415. In Henson, even the plaintiff's attorney "acknowledged at oral argument that
the draftsmen of (b)(2) did not contemplate defendant classes ......
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though the framers intended division 23(b)(2) to be used in the civil
rights field to determine substantive due process concerns, 8" the Advisory Committee Notes do not seem to discuss how this subdivision
might be employed to certify a defendant class.14 In fact, the Advisory
Committee Notes discussion of 23(b)(2) precludes the use of defendant
classes. The Advisory Committee Notes specifically refer to the situation where "a party has taken action or refused to take action with
.85The words "a party" in this context refer
respect to a class...
to a single defendant.
This language of the Advisory Committee Notes has had substantial impact on courts that have refused to certify defendant classes
under the literal approach to 23(b)(2). 8 6 However, other courts have
used 23(b)(2) to certify defendant classes and several approaches have
evolved to accomplish this. The instrumental and plaintiff-based
approaches8 7 have developed as the theories Under which 23(b)(2)
defendant classes can be certified. Other courts have sought to override the 23(b)(2) requirements completely by using the juridical link
test.
a.

The Literal Approach

Three circuit courts have refused to certify defendant classes
under the plain meaning of Rule 23(b)(2).8 s As noted before, the
language of 23(b)(2) seems to preclude the use of a defendant class
action because the party opposing the class in the case of defendant
class certification, the plaintiff or plaintiff class, must have acted or
refused to act in a way that requires the relief sought. Courts have
used the plain meaning of the rule itself and the Advisory Committee
Notes to determine that a defendant class is not allowed under
23(b)(2).
In Paxman v. Campbell,89 a suit in which a defendant class of
school boards was sued over maternity leave provisions, the Fourth
83. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MELLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1775, at 470
("subdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 primarily to facilitate the bringing
of class actions in the civil rights area").
84. See generally Advisory Committee Note, supra note 8.
85. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 8.
86. See Henson, 814 F.2d at 414; Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200,
1203-04 (6th Cir. 1983); Paxman v. Campbell 612 F.2d 848, 854-55 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied sub noma., 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
87. See Comment, Defendant Class Actions, supra note 56, at 312. These are
the classifications of the author.
88. See supra note 84.
89. 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
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Circuit held that 23(b)(2) does not allow for defendant classes. 9° The

court based its holding on the Advisory Committee Notes and held
that Rule 23(b)(2) does not provide for this type of class action. 9' As
noted before, the Advisory Committee Notes referred to "a party"
opposing the class that has acted or refused to act in regard to the
class. The Paxman court interpreted this to mean a single defendant.
Thompson v. Bd. of Education,92 a suit similar to Paxman, involved
a defendant class of school boards being sued for pregnancy discrimination of teachers. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on

Paxman,93 and held that Rule 23(b)(2) "contemplates certification of

a plaintiff class against a single defendant, not the certification of a
defendant class." 94

Finally, in Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 95 where the plaintiffs
sought to certify a defendant class of local welfare departments, the
Seventh Circuit Court held that "the language of (b)(2) is against
certification of a defendant class" and that "it is the alleged wrongdoer, the defendant-never the plaintiff. . . who will have 'acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class'." 96 The

court went on to hold that the Advisory Committee Notes "make no
reference to defendant class actions in connection with (b)(2)." 97
b.

The Instrumental Approach

Courts employing the instrumental approach to 23(b)(2) determine the nature of relief sought and then use the appropriate 23(b)
90. Id. at 854 ("as is clear from the language of the Rule, it is applicable to
situations in which a class of plaintiffs seeks injunctive relief against a single
defendant-the party opposing the class ....").
91. Id. See also 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & M. KANE, supra note 17, § 1775,
at 461, which states:
It also should be noted that the wording of the Rule suggests that the
injunctive relief must be sought in favor of the class. As a result, an action
to enjoin a class from pursuing or failing to pursue some course of conduct
would not fall under Rule 23(b)(2) and would have to qualify under Rule
23 (b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(3)....
Id.

92. 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
93. Id. at 1204.
94. Id. However the court left open the possibility that a defendant class might
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) in limited circumstances where "individual defendants
are all acting to enforce 'a locally administered state statute or similar administrative
policies."' Id.
95. 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 414.
97. Id.
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subdivision. If the primary relief sought is injunctive or declaratory
relief, then the appropriate subdivision is 23(b)(2). In Marcera v.
Chinlund,98 a suit involving a defendant class of sheriffs, the Second
Circuit Court held that "although a literal reading of the rule might
indicate otherwise, it is now settled that 23(b)(2) is an appropriate
vehicle for injunctive relief against a class of local public officials." 99
In this case, the court is using the phrase "injunctive relief" to
determine that the class may be certified under 23(b)(2). In Doss v.
Long,'00 where a defendant class of justices of the peace and county
courts were certified in order to allow a challenge to a court fee
system, the Northern District Court of Georgia followed the Marcera
holding, and held that "Rule 23(b)(2)•class is particularly appropriate
to the assertion of class-based civil rights."' 0 The court in Doss was
"unwilling to deprive the plaintiff of the useful measure."' 0 2
The problem with the instrumental approach is that only a few
words of 23(b)(2) are selectively used to certify a defendant class:
injunctive or declaratory relief. The rest of the language of 23(b)(2)
is ignored. The instrumental approach is not much different from the
approach used by courts which completely ignore the language of
23(b)(2) and certify a defendant class without any discussion of
23(b)(2).10 3 The Doss court attempts to distinguish its decision from
the decision of courts that have not discussed 23(b)(2) in certifying a
defendant class. 1°4 However, by keying in on the words injunctive or
declaratory relief, the court, in effect, ignores the entirety of 23(b)(2).
1 the court, in discussing
In Henson,05
Marcera and Doss, noted "[iun
most [cases] there is no discussion of the lawfulness of the certification; the court just does it."'0 The court states, even if there is a
98. 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Lombard v.
Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979).
99. Id. at 1238 (footnotes omitted) (however, the court did recognize this was
not a literal interpretation of the rule).
100. 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
101. Id.at 119.
102. Id. (Although the court also admits that rule 23(b)(2) is inapplicable on its

face).

103. See Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga., 1968); Kane v. Fortson,
369 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
104, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981) The court takes what it calls a "third
approach," but as noted above this approach does not discuss the language of
23(b)(2) but holds that plaintiffs are in need of the "useful measure of" defendant
class certification.
105. 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 413.

1987:143]

DEFENDANT CLASS CERTIFICATION

discussion, it is perfunctory and simply based on the idea that
plaintiffs should not be denied the opportunity to certify defendant
107
classes.
c.

The Plaintiff-Based Approach

Courts employing the plaintiff-based approach try to work with
all the language of 23(b)(2) and try to find an act or non-act on the
part of the plaintiff that necessitates the need for final injunctive or
declaratory relief and thus brings the class within the rule. In utilizing
this approach, courts try to find that a plaintiff is restricted from
doing something or must act in a different manner because of the
issue being litigated. In other words, since 23(b)(2) states that there
be an act or non-act by the party opposing the class that requires
injunctive or declaratory relief, the plaintiff must have acted or
refused to act in order to fit within the language of the rule. Some
courts hold that the plaintiff filing suit is sufficient to satisfy the
23(b)(2) requirement of an act. 08 If a plaintiff or plaintiff class files
a suit in response to the act or non-act on the part of a defendant
class, then this action on the part of the plaintiff constitutes the act
required by 23(b)(2). 10 9
Although this approach seems to adhere to the language of
23(b)(2), there are two problems. First, the action on the part of the
plaintiff can clearly be considered a reaction to the defendant's initial
act and is not the act requiring injunctive or declaratory relief. '10 For
instance, if a defendant class is not applying a statute with respect to
a plaintiff or plaintiff class, then this is the action that requires the
court to issue an injunction, not the plaintiff's act of filing a lawsuit.
Second, a problem exists in civil rights litigation where the defendant
acted or refused to act on grounds that relate to the plaintiff's status;
i.e., racial or sexual discrimination."' When a plaintiff's status is the
107. Id.
108. See Pennsylvania v. Local 542 Int'l. Union of Operating Engineers, 469 F.
Supp. 329, 416 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd. mem., 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania,
458 U.S. 375 (1982); United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 69394 (D.D.C. 1977); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301, 304 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
109. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (because
of a state homosexual statute, the plaintiff must act in a certain manner to avoid
prosecution), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
110. See Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638, 651-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983) "[T]he
language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) must be 'wrenched to fit'. . . the concept of a
defendant class ....
Id. at 648.
111. See Comment, Defendant Class Action, supra note 56, at 315.
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basis for the litigation, then it is not the plaintiff's act which caused
the litigation. Rather, it is the defendant who acted inappropriately
with respect to the plaintiff's class.
Again, the problem with using either the instrumental approach
plaintiff-based approach is that most of the language of 23(b)(2)
the
or
is ignored. Courts utilizing the instrumental approach focus on the
relief sought, injunctive or declaratory, and ignore the rest of the rule
which requires an act or non-act on the part of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff-based approach looks at the action on. the part of the
plaintiff, but ignores the language of 23(b)(2) which requires an act
or non-act on the part of the party opposing the class which necessi2
tates final injunctive or declaratory relief." Neither of these two
approaches takes in the full scope of 23(b)(2).
2.

The JuridicalLink Test.

The final problem with defendant class certification under 23(b)(2)
is highlighted by the juridical link test. The test is used to place tighter
restrictions in the 23(a) requirements of numerousity, commonality,
typicality and adequacy of representation" 3 in order to insure defendant class homogenity. The problem with the juridical link test is its
inadequate protection of defendant classes and its seeming unrelatedness to the requirements of 23(b)(2).
The juridical link test attempts to place greater limitations on the
requirements of 23(a) for defendant class certification although on
the surface the requirements of 23(a) would apply equally to plaintiff
or defendant class certification. However, defendant class certification
under 23(a) presents some unique problems that require additional
discussion. The basic problem in defendant class certification is that
the plaintiff picks the defendant class representative. The unnamed
defendants then become potentially bound in a suit in which they had
no choice over their representation." 4 The plaintiff picks his or her
opposition and the defendant class representative may then become
112. See supra note 48, at Rule 23(b)(2).
113. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
114. The court in Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987), was clearly concerned about this problem. If a
defendant finds himself or herself in a 23(b)(2) class, there are no provisions for
mandatory notice or opting out as in the 23(b)(3) subdivision. The court held that it
would be odd if a rule of procedure would permit a defendant class without requiring
notice. This lack of mandatory notice for 23(b)(2) defendant class members was an
important consideration for the court in Henson in holding that 23(b)(2) just does
not sanction defendant classes. Id. at 415.
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an unwilling participant. The plaintiff can choose a class representative
who is weak, or has a small stake in the outcome or limited financial
resources."' Even with these liabilities, a defendant class could still
be certified within the limiting factors of 23(a).
In order to avoid the potential problem of a weak or unsuitable
representative or a representative whose defenses are not common or
typical for the other unnamed defendants, the juridical link test has
been developed. It has been used to further limit class heterogeneity.
The test is defined as: "those defendant classes whose members share
a relationship predating the litigation, and whose role in the litigation
derives from their membership in the preexisting group." 6 For
example, if a suit is brought against a defendant class of township
trustees, challenging the constitutionality of a state's poor relief laws,
then it is the defendant's relationship of enforcing the statute that
juridically links each defendant."1 In other words, since the defendants
are enabled to enforce the statute, this is what 'links' them into the
litigation."'1
The juridical link test has been used by some courts to insure
that a defendant class is homogeneous."19 This primarily impacts the
typicality 2° and adequacy of representation requirements of 23(a).' 2'
The first advantage of the juridically linked group is that because of
the preexisting relationship between class members, the defendant
class representative is more likely to assert the claims or defenses of
the other class members. 22 For example, where a group of officials
115. Comment, Defendant Class Actions, supra note 56, at 300.
116. Note, Certification of Defendant Classes, Supra note 20, at .1389. "Although, on its face, Rule 23(a) appears to limit class heterogenity, the cases reveal
that it is ineffective." See generally, id. The author argues in his note that the
juridical link test would limit class heterogenity.
117. Id. at 1395 n.170.
118. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982)(state sodomy law
was being challenged).
119. Note, Certification of Defendant Classes, supra note 20, at 1395 ("[T]he
parties' involvement with the subject of suit... and not the litigation itself was the
basis of their relationship.").
120. See Comment, Defendant Class Actions, supra note 56, at 305 ("Applied
to defendant classes, the juridical link test establishes a higher standard of typicality. . . ").

121. See Note, Certification of Defendant Classes, supra note 20, at 1395 ("A
juridical link connecting the defendant class members minimizes the additional
burdens imposed on the defendant class representative.").
122. Standing, which requires that parties involved in a suit have a personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation, is also a problem in defendant class actions.
A plaintiff may only have a cause of action against the named defendant, but not
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are challenged on the validity of a state statute, it is the constitutionality of the statute that is challenged, and each defendant's relationship to the statute would be the same whether the statute is
constitutional or not. Therefore, when the named defendant asserts
the constitutionality of the statute, he or she uses the same defense
as the unnamed defendants. The class representative would then be
adequate because the claim or defense would be exactly the same as
23
if the defendant was sued individually.1
Proponents also maintain that the juridical link test minimizes
the cost of defending the litigation for the class. 24 Defendants in a
preexisting group would regularly communicate about the litigation

and therefore minimize cost and notice problems.' 25 In Hopson v.

against the other unnamed defendants. The opposite also can be true. The unnamed
plaintiffs may not have a cause of action against the named defendant. Because of
this problem some courts have refused to certify either plaintiff or defendant classes.
In Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court
refused to certify a defendant class because the named plaintiff only had standing
against the named defendant. The suit involved a class of bank borrowers versus a
defendant class of banks over the interest rates that were charged on bank loans.
Because the named plaintiff had only dealt with the named defendant, the court held
that a "plaintiff may not use the procedural device of a class action to boot strap
himself into standing he lacks under the express terms of the substantive law." Id.
at 694.
In another case, La Mar v. H.B. Novelty and Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.
1973), the court refused to certify a plaintiff class, again for lack of standing. The
court held "that a plaintiff who has no cause of action against the defendant can
not 'fairly and adequately protect the interests' of those who do have such causes of
action." Id. at 466. The court, however, left open the possibility that if the class was
juridicaly linked then there would be standing.
Other courts have used the juridical link test to fulfill the standing requirement.
In Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1238 (N.D. Ind. 1976), the court found
that the presence of a juridical link satisfied the requirement of standing. Also, in
Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ind. 1975), the court held because there
was no juridical link the class could not be certified because there was no standing.
123. See Note, Certification of Defendant Classes, supra note 20, at 1395.
124. Id. at 1395-6.
125. Notice problems are also important due process concerns. Notice to unnamed class members is not mandatory when a class is certified under 23(b)(2),
although the court has discretion to order it under 23(d). Without notice, an unnamed
defendant may find himself or herself bound to a judgment in which he or she had
no knowledge. In Coleman v. McLaren, 98 F.R.D. 638, 648 (N.D. I11. 1983), the
court noted that "the very notion of a defendant class raises immediate due process
concerns." As the Supreme Court held in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), it is "an elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process" to give reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
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the court held that if a defendant class is juridically linked
"no difference in cost is apparent between an individual defense
and
a defense as a class representative."' 2 7 However, the juridical link test
does not avoid the problem of the plaintiff choosing a defendant with
inadequate resources who is unable to defend the suit even individually. Although there may be no difference in the claim or defenses
between the unnamed defendants and the class representative, if the
class representative lacks the financial resources to pursue the suit,
the unnamed defendants would still have inadequate representation. 128
Finally, the juridical link test substantially reduces the risk of
unmanageable defendant classes since litigation involving juridically
linked defendants involves a single substantive issue: the constitutionality of a statute. 129
However, in Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 13 0 where the plaintiffs were attempting to have a defendant class of local, non-receiving
welfare agencies certified in order to determine whether these agencies
were required to follow state procedural rules on welfare eligibility,,"
the court found that it was only an accident that the class was limited
to the 65 counties of Illinois.112 The defendants in Henson could have
met the juridical link test. They were all involved in the same business,
dispensing welfare benefits. The activity predated the litigation, and
the issue to be determined was whether state procedural rules applied
to non-receiving welfare agencies. However, the court held that as the
plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument, "this suit could have been
brought as a nationwide class action pitting all welfare applicants in
the United States who are being denied due process of law against all
the welfare departments in the United States thought to be denying
those benefits."33 Under these circumstances, even a juridically linked
Schilling,26

126. 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
127. Id. at 1237.
128. Although an individual with inadequate resources does not preclude a suit
against him or herself, it does present a problem when a defendant represents a
class.
See Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir.) ("The law
firm
retained by one Illinois township of modest size is being asked to shoulder responsibility for defending the interests of hundreds of others .... "), cert. granted, 108
S.
Ct. 283 (1987).
129. Note, Certification of Defendant Classes, supra note 20, at 1396 ("Furthermore, a test that certifies juridically-linked defendant classes alleviates the
fear
of authorizing unmanageable defendant class litigation.").
130. 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987).
131. Id. at 412.
132. Id. at 415.
133. Id.
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defendant class could become unmanageable. In Henson, the court
goes on to hold, "a welfare department of Eugene, Oregon might
find itself an unnamed defendant in the Central District of Illi-

nois.

. .

.

134

• A defendant could conceivably find him or herself as an unnamed
defendant in a nationwide class based upon the defendant's business
or the services the defendant performs. The juridical link test is
helpful in determining the typicality of the defendant's claims or
defenses and whether the named defendant is an adequate representative. However, the juridical link test does not prevent all problems
of defendant class certification. In the case of a nationwide class, the
court in Henson held "that a federal court should not claim such
jurisdiction on the basis of a rule of procedure not intended to confer
it."

35

Although the juridical link test seems to apply only to the
requirements of 23(a), the test does impact 23(b)(2) in that courts
have used the finding of a juridically linked defendant class to satisfy
the requirements of 23(b)(2). 136 One proponent has suggested the
juridical link test is a better alternative to defendant class certification
37
under 23(b)(2) than the instrumental or plaintiff-based test.1 The
author argues that "[c]ourts faced with requests to certify defendant
classes should interpret Rule 23(b)(2) as requiring that class members
share a relationship predating the litigation, and that class members
role in the litigation derive from their membership in the preexisting
group.'1 3 For example, in Henson, while the dissent did concur that
the defendant class could not be certified, it was not because of the
limiting language of 23(b)(2), but because the local welfare agencies
were not juridically linked. 39 Using the rationale of the dissent, when
134. Id.
135. Id. at 416.
136. See Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 527-28 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (Although the
defendant class was not certified because each defendant had individual policies, if
there had been a juridical link then the defendant class could have been certified);
Hopson v. Shilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223, 1237-38 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (a defendant class
of township trustees was juridically linked).
137. See generally Note, Certification of Defendant Classes, supia note 20.
138. Id. at 1401.
139. Henson, 814 F.2d at 419. However, as noted above, the defendant class in
Henson could be considered juridically linked. See supra note 117-21 and accompanying text. In Henson, the welfare agencies were local non-receiving agencies, Id. at

412, which may be why the dissent did not find a juridical link. However, local

agencies have been certified as 23(b)(2) defendant classes. See Marcera v. Chinlund,
595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.) (defendant class of sheriffs), vacated on other grounds sub
nom., Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979).
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a potential defendant class is found to be juridically linked, then this
satisfies 23(b)(2). As long as the defendants are a homogenous,
juridically linked group, then the language of 23(b)(2), that there be
an act or a refusal to act on the party opposing the class, is not
applied.
IV.

PLAINTIFF OPTIONS WHEN COURTS REFUSE TO CERTIFY
DEFENDANT CLASSES UNDER 23(B)(2).

Although courts have allowed defendant class certification under
the various tests described earlier, because of the differing interpretations of 23(b)(2) in the circuit courts of appeals, a plaintiff may
find him or herself in a jurisdiction that refuses to certify a defendant
class based on a literal interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2)'s requirements. 140 The plaintiff must then look elsewhere to try and accomplish
the same purpose of binding defendants to the judgment who are not
named parties.
Besides the class action, another way to bind unnamed parties to
an injunction is through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). 14 1
140. The 7th Circuit did list several options for plaintiffs instead of defendant
class certification. See Henson, 814 F.2d at 415. The court listed several options for
a plaintiff to use if it cannot certify a defendant class: (1) If one welfare department
is found to be violating a certain statutory requirement, then "[a]ny township that
is violating the principles of White v. Roughton has strong incentives to bring itself

voluntarily into prompt and full compliance... . ."; (2) "Even if several hundred
cases are filed, they can be consolidated for pretrial discovery and for trial in one
court, before one judge, and all but the lead case stayed until that case is resolved
summarily[,]" under 28 U.S.C. 1407; and (3) Finally, the court distinguished declaratory relief from injunctive relief and stated that in some cases when declaratory
relief is sought, the plaintiff and defendant class may be reversed:
But (b)(2) speaks of declaratory as well as injunctive relief, and in a
declaratory judgement action the parties frequently get reversed. A debtor
for example might bring a suit against a class of creditors, seeking a
declaration of nonliability. In such a case it could be argued that the "real"
plaintiffs were the creditors and the "ieal" defendant the debtor-that it was
the debtor who had "acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class."
Henson, 814 F.2d at 414.
141. FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d) provides:
Form and Scope of Injunction or restraining Order. Every order
granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons
for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail,
and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts
sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action,
their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
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Rule 65(d) is designed to bind unnamed parties to an injunction when

they are "officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and

upon those persons in active concert or participation with the named
parties who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service
42

or otherwise."1
Rule 65(d) embodies "the common-law doctrine that a decree of
injunction not only binds the parties defendant but also those identified with them in interest, in 'privity' with them, or subject to their
control.' ' 43 Thus, Rule 65(d) is "a codification rather than a limitation

of courts' common-law powers. . . ."14 The term privity "[in its
broadest sense ... is defined as mutual or successive relationships to

the same right of property, or such an identification of interest of
one person with another as to represent the same legal right."' 5
Plaintiffs, instead of certifying a class of defendants under 23(b)(2)

to determine whether the statute is constitutional or not, may invoke
Rule 65(d) to show that the defendants are "in privity" or, in other

words, the suit involves the "same legal right" applied to all. For.
example, when it is the statute itself that is being challenged, the

court is asked to determine the statute's constitutionality and not each

defendant's particular application of the statute. The right to enforce
the statute is the "legal right" that is the cause of the action. By
using the 65(d) approach, the plaintiff could sue one defendant and
if the court ruled in plaintiff's favor then an injunction could be

issued against the other defendants from enforcing or not enforcing
the challenged statute. Many of the previous bilateral class actions
involved just such a scenario where a class of plaintiffs sought to sue
a class of defendants in order to challenge a statute.' 4 However, this
142. See supra note 138.
143. Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.R.L.B., 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945).
144. United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261,267 (5th Cir. 1972).
145. Peterson v. Fee Int'l., Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 938, 942 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
146. See Hopson v. Schilling, 418 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (Here a
plaintiff class of welfare recipients challenged a defendant class of township trustees
over the constitutionality of Indiana's poor relief laws.); Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 337 (1986), reh'g denied, 107
S. Ct. 23 (1987) (a single plaintiff challenged a defendant class of district attorneys
over the constitutionality of a state homosexuality statute); Danforth v. Christian,
351 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (plaintiff class of voters challenging a durational
residency requirement versus a defendant class of state election officials,); Kidd v.
Schmidt, 399 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (plaintiff class of minors incarcerated
in mental institutions without a hearing challenging a state statute versus a defendant
class of state commitment officials,); Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D.
Wis. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (plaintiff class of persons seeking to marry
challenging a permission to marry statute versus a defendant class of county clerks).
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use of privity would be a more liberal interpretation of 65(d) than
has previously been allowed.
"Privity" or "same legal right" has generally been given a
different interpretation. Before the adoption of Rule 65(d) in 1938,
courts had not taken a consistent approach as to whom could be
enjoined. 147 Injunctions were issued that attempted to bind the whole
world. 148 However, in 1930, in Alemite Mfg. Corporation v. Staff, 149
Judge Learned Hand took a very narrow view of privity in holding
that an injunction cannot be so broad that it would bind the whole
world. 150 The only person that may be enjoined besides the named
defendant, is a person that has helped bring about the forbidden act
of a party defendant. The court cannot forbid the act described, but
only the act when the defendant does it.1"1
After the adoption of Rule 65(d), courts have generally held to
the more narrow view of the rule. In Blatz v. The Fair,5 2 a manufacturer brought an infringement action against a retailer and an injunction was issued. Later, the same retailer sold exactly the same product
but had it produced by a different manufacturer. The original manufacturer, the plaintiff in Blatz, then filed an order to find the retailer
and new manufacturer in contempt of the original injunction.M3 The
court, in deciding the issue, held that although the product was the
same from each manufacturer, it did not represent the same legal
right. 5 4 Just violating the injunction is not enough. The unnamed
party must actually aid and abet the original defendant in violating
the injunction.
However, some courts have held non-parties in contempt of an
injunction even though the non-party did not aid or abet a party
147. 11 C.
148. Id.

WRIGHT,

A.

MILLER

149. 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).

& M.

KANE,

supra note 17, § 2956, at 553.

150. Id. at 832-33 (A court "cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large, no matter
how broadly it words its decree ....
It is not vested with sovereign powers to
declare conduct unlawful ....
This means that the respondent must either abet the
defendant, or must be legally identified with him. .. ").
151. See Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963). The plaintiffs
brought suit against the town mayor for desegregation of the town armory. The
plaintiffs sought a 65(d) injunction against the other members of the town council.
The court held, even though the mayor was a member of the town council the other
council members could not be considered acting in collusion with the mayor. Id. at
478.
152. 178 F. Supp. 691 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
153. Id. at 692.
154. Id. at 694.
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55
defendant in disregarding an injunction. In United States v. Hall,1
the defendant was found guilty of contempt when he entered a high
school campus in defiance of a desegregation decree the court had
previously issued. 5 6 Although the defendant had notice of the injunction, he was neither a party nor had any relationship to the parties
57
of the original desegregation order. The court held that the defendant could be held in contempt because the court had an "inherent
' 58
power ... to protect its ability to render a binding judgment.' 1 The
court held that if an outsider were allowed to racially disrupt a school,
then the injunction requiring the original plaintiff to receive a desegregated education, and requiring the original defendant to provide it,
could not be maintained. 5 9
If a plaintiff or plaintiffs won a judgment holding that a statute
was unconstitutional, even if the judgment was only against a single
defendant, plaintiffs would want to prevent other enabled organizations from applying the statute against them. When a statute, regulation, or administrative order is found to be unconstitutional, it is
not an act of the defendant that has caused the lawsuit, but rather
the legislation itself. It is therefore impossible for another party to
aid or abet a defendant in violating an injunction because the defendant has no choice; either he is enabled to act by the state or he is
not. The legal right or identity of interests that the various potentially
bound parties might have is not based on anything that the parties
have chosen to do. The identity of interest is the statute or regulation
itself. This is analogous to an in rem injunction where the disposition
of property is what the court is controlling. In United States v. Hall,
the court held that "[flederal courts have issued injunctions binding
on all persons, regardless of notice, who come into contact with
property which is the subject of a judicial decree."'6 If other parties
who are enabled to administer a statute are not also enjoined, the
plaintiff would receive only partial relief. Under those circumstances,
the court would have less power to protect the plaintiff through the
provision of injunctive or declaratory relief.161

155. 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972).
156. Id. at 263.
157. Id. at 264.
158. Id. at 267.
159. Id.at 265.
160. Id.at 265-56.
161. However, a problem arises over whether a court can issue an injunction
over someone of whom the court does not have jurisdiction. In Waffenschmidt v.
MacKay, 763 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 794 (1986), the court
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As previously shown, courts have used the juridical link test to
ignore language of 23(b)(2) that requires an act or non-act on the part
of the plaintiff to justify the need for equitable relief. 162 Rather than
using the juridical link test requiring a preexisting relationship between
defendant class members "whose role in the litigation derives from
their membership in the preexisting group,"' 63 a better test is the 65(d)
approach to determine whether the defendants embody the same legal
right, e.g., whether they may enforce the statute or not. By using a
Rule 65(d) approach, plaintiffs would not have to try to apply the
confusing language of 23(b)(2) to a defendant class. In addition,
plaintiffs would not be focusing on particular defendants' acts, but
rather on the statute, regulation or administrative order itself.
A Rule 65(d) injunction, however, cannot be so broad as to bind
the whole world.l'4 If a plaintiff sought to bind defendants under the
65(d) "same legal right" approach, and the defendants were challenged on their individual actions or interpretation of a statute or
regulation, then the "same legal right" would not exist. The defendants would have individual approaches to the problem and these
would have to be litigated separately. The purpose of a 65(d) injunction can not be to produce "government by injunction. ' ' 165 That
certain actions of a particular defendant have been proscribed does
not mean that any person can be enjoined from that action.'6 But
held that a "mandate of an injunction issued by a federal district court runs
nationwide." Id. at 716. In Waffenschmidt, McKay, the original defendant in a
securities fraud suit, had been ordered not to dispose of any funds that were found
to belong to the Woffenschmidts. However, MacKay transferred the money to Currey
and Johnson. While the court found that if did not have traditional in personam
jurisdiction over Curry and Johnson, the court could hold Currey and Johnson in
contempt because both Currey and Johnson did have notice of the injunction and
aided and abetted MacKay in violating the injunction. Id. at 715-16. Also in United
States v. Crookshands, in which a TRO issued in Oregon which enjoined a corporation
in Washington State from fishing in the Columbia river because of previous Indian
treaties. Id. at 269. The defendants claimed that the Oregon district court did not
have jurisdiction over the residents of the State of Washington. The court held that
because the TRO was issued to protect federal law (the Indian treaties), the jurisdiction
boundaries were not at issue. Id. at 270.
162. See supra notes 110-137 and accompanying text.
163. See Note, Certification of Defendant Classes, supra note 20, at 1394-95.
164. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d. Cir. 1930).
165. Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REv. 719,
732 (1965).
166. See Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 530 (D.C. Ind. 1975), dismissed on
other grounds, 437 F. Supp. 505 (1977) (A plaintiff class of individuals who had
been held because they were unable to post bond pending trial versus a defendant
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when a particular statute, regulation or administrative order is the
subject of the controversy, then a 65(d) injunction can be issued
against other parties who are enabled to administer the act.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has shown that courts continue to disagree over
whether defendant classes can be certified. Some courts have literally
interpreted Rule 23(b)(2) and have held that the plain meaning does
not allow for certification of defendant classes. Other courts have
determined that a defendant may be certified under 23(b)(2) if a
juridical link among the defendants is found. However, the juridical
link test only applies to the requirements of 23(a) and still does not
satisfy the language of 23(b)(2). Finally, courts have also certified
defendants by either ignoring the rule's language altogether or by
finding an act or non-act on the part of the plaintiff or plaintiff class
as fitting the requirements of the rule.
None of the approaches taken by courts that have certified
23(b)(2) defendant classes have looked to the entire language of the
rule. However, if a literal interpretation of 23(b)(2) were adopted,
plaintiffs would never be able to sue multiple defendants by certifying
a 23(b)(2) defendant class, except through the use of joinder provisions.
Expanding the scope of 65(d) gives plaintiffs another option. If
plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a statute or regulation,
then all defendants have the "same legal right" to enforce or not
enforce. The plaintiff could sue a single defendant and enjoin all
others since it is the regulation itself that is at issue and not the
defendants' independent actions or applications. This would be similar
to an in rem proceeding. However, Rule 65(d) cannot be used to bind
everyone who has an interest in the subject of the suit. If the question
turns on how each party interprets or enforces a statute or regulation,
then individual suits are called for in order to protect the due process
concerns of the defendant. An injunction cannot be used to legislate.
However, in the limited context of determining the constitutionality
of a statute, a Rule 65(d) approach may be used by plaintiffs to
class of state judicial officers. The court refused to certify a defendant class because
the plaintiffs were not challenging the constitutionality of a statute or common law,
"so no common thread among defendants."); Greenhouse v. Greco, 617 F.2d 408
(5th Cir. 1980) (A Catholic school was sued as a class representative in a suit alleging
discrimination. The court refused to certify the defendant class under 23(a) because
the school was not an adequate representative. The court held that each school was
a separate corporation and ran its own operation.).
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enforce their rights when the option of certifying a 23(b)(2) defendant
class is unavailable.
DIANFE TERRELL

